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CONSUMER WELFARE: WOULD COMPETITIVE
INJURY CLAIMS UNDER THE NEW MEXICO
UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT
ACTUALLY UNDERMINE
CONSUMER PROTECTION?
Raquel Koch Pinto*

When the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act (UPA) was enacted in
1967, the language adopted did not clearly state whether the
legislature intended to confer standing to competitors to sue for
unfair or deceptive trade practices. Before the New Mexico
Supreme Court decision in Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House
CGM, LLC,1 the New Mexico Court of Appeals and the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico—applying state
law—had interpreted the statutory term “any person” as an
opening for businesses to sue competitors under the UPA in
certain circumstances. However, the New Mexico Supreme Court
approached the UPA in a different way and limited standing under
the UPA to consumers, based on the legislative history of the
statute. This interpretation of the UPA goes in the opposite
direction taken by other jurisdictions interpreting similar statutes
and limits the resources available to businesses to recover for
actual damages suffered due to their competitors’ misconduct
under the UPA. Moreover, as this note intends to prove, this
interpretation of the UPA affords less protection for consumers.
This note explores the topic of competitive injury under the UPA
in New Mexico by (1) presenting the background of the adoption
of the UPA and the New Mexico Supreme Court decision in
Gandydancer; (2) discussing how consumers’ rights would not be
diminished by allowing business competitors to sue for competitive
injury under the UPA; (3) discussing the similarities between the
UPA and antitrust law, which accomplishes its goals by allowing
suits for competitive injury; (4) arguing that the violations of the
UPA would be deterred if business competitors had standing to
sue for competitive injury under the UPA; (5) discussing whether
*
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there is a possible trend—with the recent amendments to the Motor
Carrier Act—indicating that the legislature is inclined to expand
a right of action for competitive injury under the UPA; (6)
exploring how other jurisdictions have adopted and interpreted
statutes similar to the UPA; and finally (7) suggesting that the New
Mexico legislature should revisit the UPA and include a provision
that clearly grants standing not only to consumers but also to
business competitors to sue for competitive injury.

INTRODUCTION
Are consumers better protected against businesses engaging in unfair or
deceptive trade practices when the law grants standing under consumer protection
statutes only to the consumer and the state attorney general? Or would the market,
and as a consequence, consumers, be better off if business competitors were granted
standing to sue competitors for engaging in unfair or deceptive trade practices? This
is an issue that only recently reached New Mexico’s highest court.
New Mexico case law makes it clear that business competitors may not sue
for competitive injury2 under the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act (UPA).3 In
Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that competitive injury suits are not allowed under the UPA.4 The Supreme Court
reasoned that when the legislature amended the statute and removed the phrase
“unfair methods of competition” from the statute, it eliminated competitive injury
claims from the protected zone of interest under the UPA.5 Moreover, the court also
stated that consumer protection would be undermined if business competitors had
standing to sue competitors under the UPA. 6
Consumer protection statutes serve two main functions: first, they bring
justice when there is a violation of the law, which impacts an innocent consumer,
and second, they deter future violations that could impact the public as a whole.7
Consumer welfare is the ultimate goal of such statutes, and, seeking this goal, New
Mexico courts have recognized that the UPA, as a consumer protection statute,
should receive the “broadest possible application.”8 The UPA created a private right
of action for “any person who suffers any loss of money or property . . . as a result
of any employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful
2. Injury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Competitive injury . . . A wrongful
economic loss caused by a commercial rival, such as the loss of sales due to unfair competition; a
disadvantage in a plaintiff’s ability to compete with a defendant, caused by the defendant’s unfair
competition.”).
3. Gandydancer, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 1, 453 P.3d at 436.
4. Id.
5. Id. ¶ 20, 453 P.3d at 440; see also discussion infra Part I.B.
6. Gandydancer, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 24–28, 453 P.3d at 441–442.
7. Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State and Private Enforcement of
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Laws, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 933 (2017).
8. Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, 2018-NMCA-064, ¶¶ 10–11, 429 P.3d 338, 342;
see also Gandydancer, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 24, 453 P.3d at 441.
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by the Unfair Practices Act.”9 Before the New Mexico Supreme Court decision in
Gandydancer,10 the New Mexico Court of Appeals11 and the New Mexico federal
court12—making an Erie-guess13—both had recognized that businesses had a private
right of action against competitors under the UPA, based on the plain language of
the statute and the New Mexico Supreme Court dicta in a previous case.14
This note argues that the New Mexico Supreme Court’s holding in
Gandydancer overlooks one reasonable and critical interpretation of the UPA. Under
such interpretation, the court could have found that the legislature did not eliminate
business competitor standing from the UPA with the 1971 amendment. Furthermore,
this note argues that consumer protection would, in fact, be enhanced if business
competitors had standing to sue under the UPA. The legislature itself has signaled
that it agrees with this position as it has created a private right of action for business
competitors to sue a competitor who engages in unfair or deceptive trade practices
under the New Mexico Motor Carrier Act.15
Part I of this note provides a brief history of the adoption of the UPA by
New Mexico—including the amendments that changed the statutory language—as
well as an assessment of competitive injury prior to the New Mexico Supreme
Court’s decision in Gandydancer. Part I next discusses Gandydancer, with an
analysis of the New Mexico Supreme Court’s holding and the reasoning behind the
decision that reversed the New Mexico Court of Appeals’ ruling.
Part II argues that, contrary to the New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion,
competitive injury claims under the UPA do not undermine consumer protection.
This section provides a comparison between the UPA and federal antitrust laws—a
framework with similar consumer protection goals. Federal antitrust laws recognize
that business competitors have standing to sue competitors who have engaged in
unlawful conduct under antitrust laws. Part II also addresses how deterrence goals
can be achieved by allowing businesses to sue for competitive injury.
Part III first explores how the New Mexico Legislature expanded the zone
of interests protected from unfair and deceptive trade practices within the context of
the Motor Carrier Act.16 It then considers whether this expansion suggests a possible
trend indicating that the legislature is inclined to expand a right of action for
competitive injury under the UPA. Additionally, Part III examines other states’
approaches to competitive injury under consumer protection laws similar to the UPA.
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10 (2005).
10. Gandydancer, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 1, 453 P.3d at 436.
11. Gandydancer, 2018-NMCA-064, ¶ 1, 429 P.3d at 340.
12. First Nat’l Bancorp Inc. v. Alley, 76 F. Supp. 3d 1261, 1266 (D.N.M. 2014).
13. Erie Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The principle that a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction over a case that does not involve a federal question must apply the
substantive law of the state where the court sits.”); see also Bhasker v. Kemper Cas. Ins. Co., 361 F. Supp.
3d 1045, 1137 n.34 (D.N.M. 2019) (“In the absence of an authoritative pronouncement from the highest
court, a federal court’s task under the Erie doctrine is to predict how the state’s highest court would rule
if presented with the same case.”).
14. Gandydancer, 2018-NMCA-064, ¶¶ 1, 22, 429 P.3d at 340, 345; Alley, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 1263,
1266 (citing Page & Wirtz v. Solomon, 1990-NMSC-063, 110 N.M. 206, 794 P.2d 349 (1990)).
15. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2A-33 (2013); see also discussion infra Part III.A.
16. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2A-33 (2013); see also Albuquerque Cab Co., Inc. v. Lyft, Inc., 460 F.
Supp. 3d 1215, 1218 (D.N.M. 2020).

Summer 2021

CONSUMER WELFARE

503

This note ultimately suggests that the New Mexico Legislature revisit this statute and
create an explicit cause of action for business competitors who suffered actual
damages due to their competitors’ unlawful practices under the UPA.
I.

COMPETITOR STANDING UNDER THE UPA

On the federal level, consumer protection and federal antitrust laws are part
of an overlapping system with the common goal of promoting consumer welfare.17
Consumer protection laws date back to the enactment of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Act in 1914.18 But, on the state level, most unfair practices act
statutes were enacted between the 1960s and 1970s, when states and the FTC itself
realized that the FTC alone could not protect all consumers.19 This section provides
(a) a brief history of the development of consumer protection laws on the federal and
state levels; (b) details on the evolution of the New Mexico UPA; (c) the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Mexico and New Mexico Court of Appeals’
interpretations of competitor standing under the UPA before the New Mexico
Supreme Court’s decision in Gandydancer; and (d) a closer look into the facts of
Gandydancer and the rationale behind the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision.
A.

Consumer Protection Laws

The concepts of consumer protection laws and antitrust20 walk hand in
hand. In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act—the first antitrust legislation—
aimed at “preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”21 And in
1914, Congress passed two other important antitrust laws, the Clayton Act and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act.22 The Clayton Act regulates mergers and
acquisitions that may “substantially lessen competition” or have a tendency to
“create a monopoly.”23 The FTC Act initially made unlawful the “unfair methods of
competition.” 24 Later, in 1938, with the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, the FTC Act also
prohibited “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”25 Although the concept of
“unfairness” might be “elusive and imprecise,” its use allows the law to be “elastic
and evolutionary.”26 With that in mind and recognizing that a settled list of unlawful
17. See Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with
Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2239 (2012).
18. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws.
19. Pridgen, supra note 7, at 911, 915.
20. Antitrust Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“antitrust law (1890) 1. The body of
law designed to protect trade and commerce from restraints, monopolies, price-fixing, and price
discrimination . . . . Often shortened to antitrust. — Also termed (BrE) competition law.”).
21. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; 1 CONSUMER LAW SALES PRACTICES AND CREDIT REGULATION § 119, Development of
F.T.C. Standards, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2020).
25. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 18; CONSUMER LAW SALES PRACTICES AND CREDIT
REGULATION § 119, supra note 24.
26. CONSUMER LAW SALES PRACTICES AND CREDIT REGULATION § 119, supra note 24; see also
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931) (noting that the phrase “unfair methods
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practices could soon become obsolete, Congress selected this broad language when
it enacted this antitrust and consumer protection law.27
Antitrust laws protect competition in the marketplace for the benefit of
consumers.28 Congress’s intent to protect consumers and competition can be inferred
from the FTC Act public policy discussion regarding FTC’s authority:
The Commission shall have no authority . . . to declare unlawful
an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair
unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.29
Additionally, the commission was entrusted with enforcing both federal
consumer protection laws and federal antitrust laws.30
However, the FTC’s authority to enforce consumer protection was limited
to interstate commerce.31 Thus, there was a need to extend consumer protection to
the states.32 Between the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of states adopted some kind
of consumer protection legislation, empowering states and consumers “in the fight
against fraud in the marketplace. 33 These consumer protection laws—commonly
known as “little FTC acts”—largely extended the protections created by the FTC Act
to the states—usually granting enforcement powers to the state attorney general—
and to the consumers—granting a private right of action to consumers.34 In most
states, the consumer protection laws that protect against unfair and deceptive trade
practices provide that relevant interpretations of the FTC Act should guide the law’s

of competition” has a broader meaning and stating that it “does not admit a precise definition”); Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (referencing the process of
“measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness [the FTC]
considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the
antitrust laws”).
27. CONSUMER LAW SALES PRACTICES AND CREDIT REGULATION § 119, supra note 24 (“Congress
deliberately selected the general language of ‘unfairness’ because it recognized that a statutory list of
specific forbidden practices would invite circumvention and would quickly become obsolete.”) (quoting
Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Acts or Practices” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
70 GEO.L.J. 225, 226 (1981)).
28. Antitrust
Div.,
DEP’T
JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/mission#:~:text=
The%20goal%20of%20the%20antitrust,fair%20competition%20in%20the%20marketplace.&text=Com
petition%20provides%20businesses%20the%20opportunity,field%2C%20unhampered%20by%20antico
mpetitive%20restraints (“The goal of the antitrust laws is to protect economic freedom and opportunity
by promoting free and fair competition in the marketplace. Competition in a free market benefits American
consumers through lower prices, better quality and greater choice.”); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal.,
Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983) (“[T]he Sherman Act was enacted to
assure customers the benefits of price competition, and our prior cases have emphasized the central interest
in protecting the economic freedom of participants in the relevant market.”).
29. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(n) (West) (emphasis added).
30. Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement.
31. Pridgen, supra note 7, at 915.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 911–12.
34. Id.
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application.35 While the FTC Act does not create a private right of action, “[a]ll states
currently feature such a private right of action in their [consumer protection]
statutes.”36 This private right of action serves two functions: to bring justice when
there was a violation of the consumer protection laws and to “deter unfair practices
in a way that protects the public as a whole.”37
B.

The Enactment and Evolution of the UPA

The UPA was modeled after the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,38
which also served as a model to other states’ consumer protection statutes.39 The
model act was “designed to bring state law up to date by removing undue restrictions
on the common-law action for deceptive trade practices.”40 The prefatory note that
accompanied the 1964 draft of the model act clarified that “unfair trade practices,”
also referred to as “unfair competition,” included an array of legal wrongs—
”notoriously undefined”—for which limits had not been established.41
When the New Mexico Legislature enacted the UPA in 1967, section 3 of
the act—titled Unfair Competition and Practices Declared Unlawful—declared
unlawful “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce.”42 New Mexico’s UPA was first amended in
1971 when the state legislature expanded the definition of unfair or deceptive trade
practice and described as unlawful any conduct that falls within the definition of
“unfair or deceptive practices and unconscionable trade practices in the conduct of
any trade or commerce.”43 This amendment also removed the—apparently
repetitive44—term “unfair methods of competition” from the prohibited practices
section. 45
Initially, the only form of a private right of action available under the UPA
was injunctive relief.46 However, the 1987 amendment created the possibility for
35. Id. at 917; see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-4 (1967).
36. Pridgen, supra note 7, at 932.
37. Id. at 933.
38. Stevenson v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 1991-NMSC-051, ¶ 12, 112 N.M. 97, 811 P.2d 1308.
39. Pridgen, supra note 7, at 912.
40. Richard F. Dole Jr., Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: A Prefatory Note, 54 TRADEMARK
REP. 435, 436 (1964).
41. Id. at 435 (“This type of conduct [(unfair trade practices)] is notoriously undefined. Commonly
referred to as ‘unfair competition,’ its metes and bounds have not been charted.”).
42. Unfair Practices Act, ch. 268, § 3, 1967 N.M. Laws 1459.
43. Unfair Practices Act, ch. 240, § 3, 1971 N.M. Laws 826.
44. In the “Definitions” section of the original UPA, unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive trade practices received a common definition under Section 2(C): “‘Unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ means any one or more of the following . . . .”).
Unfair Practices Act, ch. 268, § 2, 1967 N.M. Laws 1459.
45. Unfair Practices Act, ch. 240, § 3, 1971 N.M. Laws 826.
46. Unfair Practices Act, ch. 268, § 8, 1967 N.M. Laws 1459 (“A person likely to be damaged by a
deceptive trade practice of another may be granted an injunction against it under the principles of equity
and on terms that
the court considers reasonable. Proof of monetary damage, loss of profits, or intent to deceive is not
required. Relief granted for the copying of an article shall be limited to the prevention of confusion or
misunderstanding as to source.”).
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recovery of actual damages,47 available to “any person” who “suffers any loss of
money or property, real or personal, as a result of any employment by another person
of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by the [UPA].”48 The UPA broadly
defines “person” as “natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, associations,
cooperative associations, clubs, companies, firms, joint ventures or syndicates.”49
Under the current version of the UPA, the legislature defined “unfair or
deceptive trade practices” and itemized a non-exhaustive50 list of conduct that is
considered unlawful:
“[U]nfair or deceptive trade practices” means an act specifically
declared unlawful pursuant to the Unfair Practices Act, a false or
misleading oral or written statement, visual description or other
representation of any kind knowingly made in connection with the
sale, lease, rental or loan of goods or services or in the extension
of credit or in the collection of debts by a person in the regular
course of the person’s trade or commerce, that may, tends to or
does deceive or mislead any person and includes [19 listed
practices].51
Thus, it is possible to interpret that, as stated by the New Mexico Court of
Appeals,52 a business competitor—which would fall under the term “any person”—
who “suffers any loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of any
employment by” another competitor—falling under the term “another person”—”of
a method, act or practice declared unlawful” by the UPA has a right of action under
the statute. If, under the UPA, any person who suffers a loss of money or property,
as a consequence of an act declared unlawful under the statute, has a right of action,
and a business competitor is considered a person, then a plain reading of the statute
allows a conclusion that a business competitor has a right of action under the UPA.
C.

Competitive Injury in New Mexico: A Pre-Gandydancer View

Until Gandydancer, New Mexico courts had not explicitly decided whether
a business had standing to sue a competitor for violation of the UPA. Although the
UPA states that any person who suffers damages due to another person’s unlawful
conduct under the statute may recover actual damages and the fact that businesses

47. Recovery for actual damages or the sum of one hundred dollars, whichever is greater. See Unfair
Practices Act, ch. 187, 1987 N.M. Laws 1051.
48. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(B) (2005); see also Unfair Practices Act, ch. 187, 1987 N.M. Laws
1051.
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(A) (2019).
50. Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House, CGM, LLC, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 12, 453 P.3d 434, 438.
51. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D) (2019) (emphasis added).
52. Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, 2018-NMCA-064, ¶ 1, 429 P.3d 338, 340
(holding that a business may sue a competitor under the UPA when the alleged unlawful conduct involves
consumer protection concerns or is addressed to the market generally).
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fall within the statutory definition of person, this question had not reached the highest
court in New Mexico.53 However, this was not a new issue for New Mexicans.54
The issue of competitive injury under the UPA had been previously brought
to court in 2014, but a federal court decided it because of diversity of jurisdiction.55
In First National Bancorp, Inc. v. Alley, the competitor-plaintiff brought a claim for
competitive injury against the competitor-defendant, alleging that the defendant had
violated the UPA and that, as a result, the plaintiff had suffered damages.56 The
defendant moved to dismiss the claim, alleging that the UPA did not recognize a
competitive injury claim.57 Three factors persuaded the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Mexico in its decision: (1) the unambiguous plain language of the
statute; (2) dicta from a New Mexico Supreme Court case that “strongly suggest[ed]
that the [court] would recognize competitor standing should a case presenting that
issue [came] before [it]”;58 and (3) the fact that the UPA is a remedial statute and, as
such, should be “liberally construed” according to New Mexico Supreme Court
precedent.59 The New Mexico District Court denied the motion to dismiss and,
making an Erie-guess, held that the UPA “recognize[d] a claim by a competitorplaintiff against a competitor-defendant.”60
The issue of competitor standing under the UPA was first addressed by New
Mexico state courts in Gandydancer. The New Mexico Court of Appeals concluded
that the broad language of the statute provided standing for businesses to seek the
statutory private remedy “so long as the competitor allege[d] a loss of money or
property resultant from any unlawful act ‘involving consumer protection concerns or
trade practices generally.’”61 The New Mexico Court of Appeals first looked at the
plain language of the statute and noted that the plain language should only be rejected
if the “literal interpretation . . . is contrary to [the statute’s] obvious intent or renders

53. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-2(A), 57-12-10(B) (2019).
54. See First Nat’l Bancorp, Inc. v. Alley, 76 F. Supp. 3d 1261 (2014). See generally Navajo Nation
v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1240 (2016) (analyzing the issue of competitor standing
under the Indian Arts and Crafts Act; competitor-defendant allegedly “violated the [act] by deceptively
marketing their products to suggest they were Indian made when, in fact, they were not”).
55. Alley, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 1261.
56. Id. at 1264. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant confused and mislead its consumers of
financial services by using a similar name, creating a similar website with a similar appearance, and
making misleading statements to First National Bancorp’s consumers, in violation of subsections 57-122(D)(2), (3), (8) of the UPA. Id. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D)(2) (2019) (“causing confusion
or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services”); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D)(3) (2019) (“causing confusion or misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection
or association with or certification by another”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D)(8) (2019) (“disparaging
the goods, services or business of another by false or misleading representations”).
57. Alley, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 1262.
58. Id. at 1263 (citing Page & Wirtz v. Solomon 110 N.M. 206, 794 P.2d 349 (1990) (“suggesting
that competitor of NMUPA defendant would have standing to obtain injunction against deceptive
advertising and that both consumers and a competitor of enterprise engaged in deceptive practice could
recover damages upon a showing of ‘loss of money or property’”)).
59. Alley, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 1266.
60. Id. at 1262.
61. Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 10, 12, 453 P.3d 434, 438
(quoting Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, 2018-NMCA-064, ¶ 20, 429 P.3d 338, 344).
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it absurd.”62 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals noted that the UPA, as remedial
legislation, should be construed “liberally to facilitate and accomplish its purpose
and intent” 63 and that the UPA’s fundamental purpose is to protect consumers from
unscrupulous business practices regardless of whether those consumers are directly
or indirectly affected.”64
Nevertheless, the New Mexico Supreme Court ultimately reversed the
Court of Appeals’ decision and held that “the legislature excluded competitive injury
from the causes of action permitted under the [UPA].”65 Consequently, business
competitors in New Mexico have no standing under the UPA.
D.

Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC: the UPA Does Not Create a
Cause of Action for Competitive Injury
i.

Facts

In Gandydancer, petitioner and respondent were business competitors,
providing “railway construction services and repair services to BNSF Railway
Company.”66 BNSF awarded a contract in New Mexico to Rock House.
“GandyDancer filed a complaint with the New Mexico Construction Industries
Division (CID) in 2015 that alleged that Rock House violated the Construction
Industries Licensing Act (CILA) . . . by performing unlicensed construction work in
New Mexico.”67 Rock House reached a settlement with CID regarding the alleged
CILA violation.68 GandyDancer then filed a complaint in district court, alleging that
Rock House had violated the UPA to obtain the contract with BNSF. 69 As a result
of Rock House’s actions, GandyDancer alleged that it had suffered damages.70
GandyDancer further alleged that, but for Rock House’s failure to disclose its lack
of license to provide railway contracting services, GandyDancer would have been
awarded the BNSF contract.71 Rock House filed a motion to dismiss, which was
denied by the district court. Subsequently, the district court certified, in an
interlocutory appeal to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, the question “whether the
UPA affords private-party standing to business competitors who are both sellers of
services, or only to buyers of goods and services.”72 Based on the statute’s plain
language, the Court of Appeals held that the UPA afforded standing.73 The New
Mexico Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and held that the UPA

62. Gandydancer, 2018-NMCA-064, ¶ 9, 429 P.3d at 342.
63. Id. ¶ 11, 429 P.3d at 342 (quoting Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 30, 147
N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73).
64. Id. ¶ 10, 429 P.3d at 342 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(C)).
65. Gandydancer, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 1, 453 P.3d at 436.
66. Id. ¶ 2, 453 P.3d at 436.
67. Id. ¶ 3, 453 P.3d at 436.
68. Id.
69. Id. ¶ 4, 453 P.3d 437.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. ¶ 5, 453 P.3d at 437.
73. Id. ¶¶ 10–12, 453 P.3d at 438 (quoting Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, 2018NMCA-064, ¶ 20, 429 P.3d 338, 344).
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does not recognize competitive injury as a cause of action.74 Thus, a business that
suffers a loss of money or property due to its competitors’ unlawful practices under
the UPA may not recover based on this statute.
ii.

Rationale

The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that it
should begin the interpretation of a statute with plain language.75 However, the
Supreme Court held that “plain meaning rule must yield when ‘equity, legislative
history, or other sources’ demonstrate that applying the plain meaning would result
in a construction contrary to the spirit of the statute.”76 In defining the zone of interest
protected by the statute, the New Mexico Supreme Court analyzed the amendments
to the statute. 77 It concluded that when the legislature “removed ‘unfair methods of
competition’ from the text of the UPA,” it “remove[d] competitive injury claims
from the protected zone of interest.”78 Furthermore, the court concluded that “[t]he
alteration evinces an intent to limit the zone of interest protected from unfair trade
practices by the UPA to consumers, not competitors.”79
The New Mexico Supreme Court also reasoned that allowing standing for
competitive injury would ultimately undermine consumer protection—contrary to
what the New Mexico Court of Appeals had debated—by suggesting that it could
“effectively displace a consumer’s remedy.”80 Additionally, the Supreme Court held
that prior New Mexico case law did not establish that the UPA created a cause of
action for competitive injury and rejected the use of dicta from Page & Wirtz v.
Solomon.81 Finally, the Court found that case law from other states interpreting other
states’ consumer protection statutes was unpersuasive because the statutes had a
different language and different legislative histories from the UPA. 82
II.
COMPETITIVE INJURY CLAIMS UNDER THE UPA: A
SUITABLE TOOL TO ENHANCE CONSUMER PROTECTION
The decision in Gandydancer could have gone in the other direction. The
New Mexico Supreme Court could have easily concluded that when the New Mexico
legislature removed the phrase “unfair methods of competition” from the UPA
language, it was not precluding competitive injury claims, but merely removing
repetitive language—considering that “unfair trade practices” and “unfair methods
of competition” were seen as synonyms by some at that time.83 Moreover, when the
74. Id. ¶ 1, 453 P.3d at 436.
75. Id. ¶ 13, 453 P.3d at 438, 439.
76. Id. ¶ 14, 453 P.3d at 439.
77. Id. ¶¶ 19–20, 453 P.3d at 440.
78. Id. But see supra text accompanying note 44.
79. Gandydancer, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 20, 453 P.3d at 440.
80. Id. ¶ 26, 453 P.3d at 442.
81. Id. ¶ 36, 453 P.3d at 443. But see Page & Wirtz v. Solomon, 1990-NMSC-063, ¶ 22, 110 N.M.
206, 794 P.2d 349 (1990) (stating that “[damages] suffered either by a consumer of goods or services, or
the commercial competitor of an enterprise engaged in deceptive trade practices” could potentially be
recovered).
82. Gandydancer, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 38, 453 P.3d at 444.
83. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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legislature later created a private right of action for recovery of damages for
violations of the UPA and used a broad language—any person—it seems clear that
it was including business competitors within the protected zone of interest of the
statute.84
However, even if the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute—that the
UPA 1971 amendment removed competitive injury claims from the protected zone
of interest—was the only one correct, consumers get hurt by the loss of this avenue
in the fight against unfair or deceptive practices. This section proposes that not only
would consumer protection not be undermined, as stated by the New Mexico
Supreme Court, but it would actually be strengthened if competitive injury claims
under the UPA were allowed.
A.

Consequences to the Consumer if Competitor Standing Was Allowed

In Gandydancer, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that UPA’s
primary purpose of protecting innocent consumers would be undermined if
competitive injury claims were allowed.85 As an example, the Court offered the
situation that BNSF—the consumer in Gandydancer—would be placed, had
GandyDancer been allowed to recover for competitive injury.86 BNSF would have a
cause of action against Rock House for violation of the Construction Industries
Licensing Act (CILA), being able to assert a claim for all the payments it made to
Rock House for the work performed while Rock House was unlicensed.87 The
Supreme Court stated that “if Gandydancer were allowed to recover damages under
the UPA, and such recovery totaled all of the Rock House assets such that Rock
House was rendered bankrupt or judgment proof, the consumer . . . could be
precluded from recovering damages under CILA.”88 Thus, BNSF’s remedies under
CILA would be undermined.89 The Supreme Court held that statutes “must be
construed, if possible, to give effect to each” one when there is an apparent conflict
between them. 90 Thus, the Supreme Court “presume[d] that the Legislature . . . has
limited the zone of interest protected under the UPA to harmonize” the tension
between the UPA and CILA, and “decline[d] to expand the zone of interest under
the UPA.”91
BNSF was not a party and did not assert any claim in GandyDancer’s action
against Rock House.92 Additionally, the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision does
not indicate that BNSF intended to bring suit against Rock House for the unlicensed
work provided. Still, it is clear that, under CILA, BNSF would be allowed to recover

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Gandydancer, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 27, 453 P.3d at 442.
Id. ¶ 26, 453 P.3d at 442.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 27, 453 P.3d at 442.
Id. ¶ 28, 453 P.3d at 442.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5, 453 P.3d at 437.
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payments made to Rock House for the unlicensed work that it received.93
Furthermore, BNSF could recover damages under the UPA for the injuries it suffered
as a result of Rock House’s unfair or deceptive practices because the UPA provides
that the relief established on this statute is in addition to other remedies available
under the common law or other state statutes.94 The same provision that allows BNSF
to bring a suit under the UPA in addition to other remedies available under common
law and other statutes—such as CILA—also provides guidance as to the intent of the
legislature when it enacted the UPA. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that there
was a tension between the UPA and CILA if competitor standing was recognized
under the UPA and consumer standing under CILA.95 However, the statute is clear
that the legislature anticipated the possibility of a cause of action arising under the
UPA at the same time that another cause of action could arise under another statute
for the same conduct.96 Nothing in the statute’s language suggests that the relief
under the UPA would be exclusive to the party who has another remedy available
under the common law or another statute. This statutory provision potentially shows
that the legislature was aware of the possibility of recovery under the UPA and
another statute—CILA. Thus, there is no true tension between these two statutes.
The Court further reasoned that BNSF’s recovery under CILA would be
undermined if GandyDancer had standing to sue Rock House under the UPA.97 But
there is no indication that Rock House would be rendered bankrupt, judgment proof,
or otherwise unable to pay a judgment if BNSF decided to assert a CILA or a UPA
claim and GandyDancer was awarded damages on its claim under the UPA.
Limiting standing under the UPA based on the possibility that a damages
award will render a competitor bankrupt and consequently hurt the consumer’s
chances of recovery is an unsound conclusion. The legislature created the possibility
of recovery under the UPA concomitantly with recovery under other statutes or the
common law. The chance that a defendant might be rendered bankrupt if a business
competitor is awarded damages under the UPA in detriment of a consumer that has
not yet been awarded damages or restitution—or that could never invoke these rights,
like BNSF—does not seem like a sound reason to deprive business competitors of a
private right of action under the UPA. Particularly considering that such a private
right of action brings potential benefits to the consumers as a whole with the deterrent
effect against violations of the statutes.98
B.

Competitive Injury Standing: A Parallel with Federal Antitrust Law

Federal antitrust law offers helpful insight for an analysis of the UPA. The
purpose of the UPA is to promote consumer protection against unfair or deceptive

93. Mascarenas v. Jaramillo, 1991-NMSC-014, ¶ 16, 111 N.M 410, 806 P.2d 59 (holding that to
allow recovery for payments made to an unlicensed contractor presents a deterrent effect by inhibiting
unlicensed contractors from performing unlicensed work).
94. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(D) (2005).
95. Gandydancer, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 28, 453 P.3d at 442.
96. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(D) (2005).
97. Gandydancer, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 27, 453 P.3d at 442.
98. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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trade practices.99 Similarly, federal antitrust laws “protect the process of competition
for the benefit of consumers.”100 As stated by Professor Wright, “[b]oth competition
and consumer protection law have aimed to protect consumer welfare, and, in turn,
consumer choices, from business practices that would diminish it.”101
The federal antitrust system is comprised of several acts, including the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, and the
Lanham Act.102
The 1890 Sherman Act, the first antitrust law, was designed as a
“comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade.”103 It makes a contract, conspiracy, or combination
that could result in unreasonable restraints on free trade or commerce among the
several states illegal.104 As stated by the United States Supreme Court, “the Sherman
Act was enacted to assure customers the benefits of price competition, and [the
Court’s] cases have emphasized the central interest in protecting the economic
freedom of participants in the relevant market.”105 Under the Sherman Act, a private
right of action was initially established in section 7 of the Sherman Act,106 which was
later replaced by section 4 of the Clayton Act. Section 4 of the Clayton Act expanded
a private right of action for money damages to all the antitrust laws.107
The Clayton Act makes several practices unlawful, including mergers and
interlocking directorates,108 that may substantially “lessen competition . . . or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce.”109 Section 4 of the Clayton Act states
99. Santa Fe Custom Shutters & Doors, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2005-NMCA-051, ¶ 17,
137 N.M. 524, 113 P.3d 347.
100. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 18; see also, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A § 45(n) (West) (establishing the
Federal Trade Commission’s authority to declare an act unfair or practice unlawful only if it causes a
“substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition”).
101. Wright, supra note 17, at 2239.
102. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 18; Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes?page=2.
103. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see also The Antitrust Laws, supra note
18.
104. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal.”); see also Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 186 (2010).
105. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538
(1983).
106. Richard Alan Arnold, Implied Right of Action under the Antitrust Laws, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV.
437, 440 (1979) (quoting Sen. Sherman’s statements when he introduced the bill that puts restraints on
free trade or commerce among the several states—”the purpose of this section was ‘to give to private
parties a remedy for personal injury caused by such a combination’”).
107. Id.
108. Interlocking Directorate, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (“The relationship
between two or more corporations who have directors or officers in common.”); Directorship, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“interlocking directorships. (1912) 1. The situation in which a director
or top executive of one corporation also serves as a director of another. 2. The situation in which a person
closely related to a director or top executive of one corporation serves as a director of another
corporation.”).
109. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West)); The
Antitrust Laws, supra note 18.

Summer 2021

CONSUMER WELFARE

513

that “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s
fee.”110
Created in the same year—1914—as the Clayton Act, the FTC Act does not
contemplate a private right of action.111 Its enforcement was restricted to cases
brought by the FTC.112 The commission was also empowered to enforce other
antitrust laws.113 Notwithstanding the FTC’s vast enforcement powers, private
plaintiffs bring about 95 percent of all antitrust cases.114 While the FTC Act declared
unlawful “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,” an unlawful practice under the
FTC Act can also be found to be a violation of other antitrust laws.115 Thus, a
potential plaintiff could establish a private right of action under another antitrust law.
Similar to the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Lanham Act creates a private
right of action and “seeks to safeguard an element of the competitive marketplace as
a means of enhancing consumer welfare.” 116 The Latham Act complements antitrust
laws by prohibiting deceptive advertising; thus, “protect[ing] the transmission of
truthful information to consumers, which is essential to a well-functioning,
competitive market.”117 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act establishes that “any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by” the acts of a person in
violation of this section may bring a civil action against such person.118 In
interpreting section 43(a), courts largely consider competitors to be the “logical and
best-placed private plaintiff.”119 Competitors are considered to be in a position to
vindicate consumers’ rights in cases of false advertising.120
In POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., the competitor-plaintiff POM
brought a civil action under the Lanham Act against Coca-Cola alleging that the
defendant engaged in deceptive and misleading conduct.121 POM produced and sold

110. 15 U.S.C.A. § 15(a) (West) (emphasis added).
111. Allan Bruce Currie, A Private Right of Action under Section Five of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1268 (1971) (“Since 1926 federal courts have held that there is no
private right of action under this section, declaring that only the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could
institute an action for its violation.”).
112. Id.
113. Enforcement, supra note 30.
114. Pridgen, supra note 7, at 934 n.109 (2017) (citing HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 16.1 (4th ed. 2011)).
115. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 18 (“The Supreme Court has said that all violations of the
Sherman Act also violate the FTC Act.”).
116. Jean Wegman Burns, The Paradox of Antitrust and Lanham Act Standing., 42 UCLA L. REV. 47,
50 (1994).
117. Id. at 55–56.
118. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (West); Burns, supra note 116, at 56.
119. Burns, supra note 116, at 56–57.
120. Id. at 66–67; see also id. at 67 n. 80 (citing Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F.
Supp. 194, 212 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“While the Act
is not directly available to consumers, it is nevertheless designed to protect consumers, by giving the cause
of action to competitors who are prepared to vindicate the injury caused to consumers.”).
121. 573 U.S. 102, 106 (2014).
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a pomegranate-blueberry juice blend product.122 Its competitor, Coca-Cola Co., also
sold a juice blend labeled as pomegranate-blueberry juice.123 However, the label
displayed in much smaller words that the juice was, in fact, a blend of five different
fruits and that it contained 0.3% pomegranate juice and 0.2% blueberry juice.124
POM alleged that the use of such a label tricked and deceived consumers and that it
suffered injury as a competitor.125 The United States Supreme Court held that POM
could bring a Lanham Act claim based on the misleading product label.126
POM, which produced actual pomegranate-blueberry juice, was “aggrieved
by [Coca-Cola]’s marketing” and lost would-be consumers.127 At the same time,
consumers lost by purchasing a product with a different quality than expected. Each
misled consumer might lack the incentives to pursue a civil action against a company
such as Coca-Cola Co.. However, a business competitor that is being injured by the
loss of potential consumers will likely be motivated to challenge its competitor’s
unlawful practices. As a result, a competitive market is maintained, and consumer
welfare is enhanced. The dominant understanding of antitrust law defends that, by
allowing competitor standing, competitors can recover damages and, more
importantly, misconduct that harms consumers is deterred. 128 The damages that can
be recovered serve as an incentive to competitor-plaintiffs to bring claims for the
benefit of the public. 129
Similar to antitrust law, the UPA seeks to protect consumer welfare. 130
When the New Mexico Legislature created a private right of action under the UPA,
it opted for using a broad language, similar to the one used by antitrust laws. 131 It
stated that “any person who suffers any loss of money or property . . . as a result of
any employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful
under the [UPA] may bring an action to recover actual damages.”132 After New
Mexico Supreme Court’s holding in Gandydancer—that competitors do not have
standing to sue under the UPA—, the New Mexico Legislature could follow a similar
rationale applied to antitrust law and amend the statute by expressly allowing
business competitors to bring suit for violation of the UPA. Business competitor suits
can serve as an instrument to deter misconducts that could harm consumers; thus,
these suits can advance the UPA’s primary purpose.

122. Id. at 105.
123. Id. at 106.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 110.
126. Id. at 121.
127. Nicolas Cornell, Competition Wrongs, 129 YALE L.J. 2030, 2041 (2020).
128. Id. at 2045–46.
129. Id.
130. Santa Fe Custom Shutters & Doors, Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2005-NMCA-051, ¶ 17,
137 N.M. 524, 113 P.3d 347.
131. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10 (2005).
132. Id. (emphasis added).
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Deterrence of Future Unlawful Conduct

This note proposes that businesses would be less likely to act in violation
of the UPA if business competitors had standing to sue for competitive injury under
the UPA.
Just like tort law, one of the goals of antitrust law is to have a deterrent
effect and prevent harm from occurring. In a dissenting opinion in Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, Justice Marshall
established this analogy between antitrust law and intentional tort.133 Justice
Marshall emphasized that the private enforcement mechanism established by
Congress in section 4 of the Clayton Act was created to “deter violators and deprive
them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to
the victims of antitrust violations.”134 In Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., the
District Court for the Southern District of New York highlighted that the award of
damages for the violation of the Lanham Act, another antitrust law, was justified by
three rationales, including “to deter the willful wrongdoer from doing so again.” 135
Similar to antitrust legislation, the UPA was created to prevent harm due to
unfair and deceptive trade practices from occurring.136 And similar to antitrust law,
a private remedy allowing business competitors to sue for competitive injury would
serve to deter violators of the UPA. The risk of having to compensate competitors
for damages would prevent businesses from acting unfairly or deceptively against
consumers.
There is little doubt that deterrent effect of the UPA would be strengthened
if businesses were allowed to sue for competitive injury. Numerous consumers do
not know about their rights under consumer protection acts, and even when they
know, they might not choose to file a consumer protection act lawsuit.137 Consumer
protection acts, including the UPA, exercise their ex-ante deterrent effect more
effectively when businesses have standing to sue their competitors for violations. For
example, businesses would likely realize that a competitor that suffered damages due
to the UPA violations of another business has more incentive to sue than a consumer
who might have been slightly injured. This knowledge would likely encourage
businesses to avoid any misconduct under the UPA.

133. 459 U.S. 519, 547 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 901 F. Supp. 2d 436, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 760 F.3d
247 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Pedinol Pharmacal, Inc. v. Rising Pharm. Inc., 570 F. Supp. 2d 498, 504
(E.D.N.Y.2008)).
136. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(A) (2005) (allowing the grant of injunctive relief when a person
is likely to be damaged by an unfair or deceptive trade practice, even when there is no proof of monetary
damage).
137. Omri Ben-Shahar, One-Way Contracts: Consumer Protection without Law, JOHN M. OLIN
PROGRAM
IN
LAW
AND
ECONOMICS
WORKING
PAPER
N O.
484
(2009),
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1347&context=law_and_economics;
see also Stephen J. Shapiro, Overcoming Under-Compensation and Under-Deterrence in Intentional Tort
Cases: Are Statutory Multiple Damages the Best Remedy?, 62 MERCER L. REV. 449, 458 (2011) (noting
that various studies show that only a small percentage of tort victims consult with a lawyer and even a
smaller percentage attempt to file a lawsuit). Also, potential litigants might have difficulty finding an
attorney.
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Competitive injury standing, combined with state and consumer standing,
affords adequate deterrence of future unfair and deceptive trade practices that could
harm consumers. With violations of the UPA less likely to happen, consumers would
be less likely to be injured, and it would be less likely that a consumer or competitor
would need to assert a claim for damages.
III. HOW SHOULD NEW MEXICO PROCEED?
Competitor standing under the UPA’s current language is not as clearly
against the legislative intent of the New Mexico Legislature as the New Mexico
Supreme Court suggested in Gandydancer. Besides the broad language used in the
statute to create private remedies,138 the New Mexico Legislature signaled that
competitor standing could be a tool to prevent unfair or deceptive trade practices
when it amended the Motor Carrier Act (MCA).139 This section discusses the MCA,
in which the New Mexico Legislature created a private right of action for business
competitors injured by a competitor’s unfair or deceptive trade practices. Next, this
section looks at other states for examples of how a private right of action for business
competitors under consumer protection law can aid in promoting consumer welfare.
Finally, this section advocates that the New Mexico Legislature should amend the
UPA and unequivocally recognize that business competitors are within the zone of
interest protected by the UPA and thus free to bring claims against competitors who
employ unfair or deceptive trade practices.
A.

Motor Carrier Act: New Mexico Legislature Recognizes Competitive
Injury Claims

The most recent amendments to the New Mexico Motor Carrier Act (MCA)
demonstrate the legislature’s belief that it is in consumers’ interest to allow
competitive injury suits by business competitors when a transportation service carrier
performs unauthorized services.140
The New Mexico Legislature amended the MCA in 2013 and included a
provision stating that “it is an unfair and deceptive trade practice under the [UPA]
for any transportation service carrier to offer or provide [unauthorized] transportation

138. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(A) (2005) (“A person likely to be damaged by an unfair or
deceptive trade practice or by an unconscionable trade practice of another may be granted an injunction
against it”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(B) (2005) (“Any person who suffers any loss of money or
property, real or personal, as a result of any employment by another person of a method, act or practice
declared unlawful by the Unfair Practices Act may bring an action to recover actual damages.”).
139. See generally Motor Carrier Act, ch. 77, 2013 N.M. Laws 753 (H.B. 194) (allowing authorized
transportation service carriers who have been damaged by a competitor that is an unauthorized
transportation service carrier to bring suit under the UPA).
140. See
generally
id.;
2013–2014
Annual
Report,
THINK
NEW
MEXICO,
https://www.thinknewmexico.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/2013AR.pdf. The 2013 amendments to the
MCA made it easier for services to enter the market and were supported by Think New Mexico, a think
tank that has a mission of improving the quality of life for New Mexicans. Id. Think New Mexico states
that it successfully helped achieve this change in the law, “[m]odernizing the state’s regulation of taxis,
limos, shuttles, and moving companies to promote job creation, small business formation, and lower prices
for consumers.” Id.
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services.” 141 The statute allows the attorney general or a person who has been
damaged or will likely be damaged to bring a claim, under the UPA, against the
unauthorized transportation service carrier.142 The legislature explicitly listed
“authorized transportation service carrier” within the meaning of “person.” 143 Thus,
the statute allows a business competitor—that is an authorized transportation service
carrier—to sue under the UPA for competitive injury when another business offers
or performs unauthorized transportation service.144
The possibility of an authorized transportation service carrier bringing a
claim for competitive injury under the UPA was addressed by the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Mexico in Albuquerque Cab Company, Inc. v. Lyft, Inc. 145 In
this case, a taxi company—an authorized transportation service carrier—brought a
competitive injury claim against the ride-share companies Uber and Lyft. 146 The
plaintiff alleged that the ride-share companies had violated the MCA by providing
unauthorized transportation service when they first entered the city’s market.147 In
ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court found that the complaint
plausibly alleged that the taxi company and the ride-share company were both
transportation service carriers operating in the same market. 148 And, because the
ride-share company did not obtain authorization pursuant to the MCA, the court held
that the taxi company had a cause of action against its business competitor. 149 The
court explained that the MCA authorizes claims when “a lawfully operating
transportation service carrier is damaged by the unlawful operation of a
transportation service carrier in the same market.”150
The defendant argued that because the MCA “merely refers to and
incorporated the provisions of the UPA, and because the UPA does not permit
business competitors suits,” the provision of the MCA should be disregarded.151 In
addressing this argument, the court raised an interesting question: “if the legislature
wanted to allow business competitor lawsuits for MCA violations, why would it
choose the UPA, which does not otherwise allow such a lawsuit, as the vehicle to
carry out this goal?”152 The plain language of the MCA “demonstrates that the
legislature intended to allow an authorized transportation service carrier to sue a
transportation services carrier who operates without authorization.” 153 However, one
possible interpretation is that the legislature, when amending the MCA in 2013,
141. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2A-33(J) (2013).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 460 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1222–24 (D.N.M. 2020).
146. Id. at 1216.
147. Id. (in 2016, the New Mexico legislature enacted the Transportation Network Company Services
Act, exempting ride-share companies from the Motor Carrier Act. The complaint in this case regards facts
prior to 2016).
148. Id. at 1218, 1221. Plaintiff reached a settlement with defendant Lyft; however, the suit continued
against defendant Uber. Id. at 1217.
149. Id. at 1222–23.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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believed that the UPA provided a private remedy for business competitors and that
this remedy was also adequate to rectify a violation of the MCA. Furthermore, the
UPA’s ultimate purpose is to protect consumers,154 and the legislature’s choice of
allowing business competitor lawsuits for MCA violations pursuant to the UPA
indicates that the purpose of the UPA is advanced by allowing this type of suit.
Thus, even if the legislature in 2013 intended that the UPA ought to be
applied in competitive injury claims exclusively under the limited context of MCA
violations, the same rationale could justify a statutory change to clarify and explicitly
confer standing to business competitors to sue for violations of the UPA in general.
As stated by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Gandydancer, “[i]t is within the
purview of the Legislature to expand the zone of interest protected by the UPA to
include competitor suits for competitive injury if that is a policy that the Legislature
decides to pursue.”155 And allowing competitive injury claims as a mechanism to
increase consumer protection is a policy consistent with the legislature’s choice
when it amended the MCA. Therefore, the legislature should expand competitor
standing to all other cases of unfair or deceptive trade practices.
B.

Competitor Standing: A Comparison with the Approach Taken by Other
Jurisdictions

When states created their first consumer protection laws between the 1960s
and 1970s, not all of them recognized a private right of action as an alternative
enforcement of these statutes. 156 However, recognizing that “states and federal
agencies could only prosecute a fraction of [unfair or] deceptive business practices,”
states adopted different forms of private remedy in an effort to deter violations of
their consumer protection laws.157 Today only Arkansas, Iowa, and North Dakota do
not have private rights of action for violations of consumer protection laws.158 Many
states allow actions for violations of consumer protection laws to be brought not only
by consumers but also by other actors. In addressing the necessity behind expanding
standing for violations of consumer protection laws beyond just consumers, the Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. Philip Morris, Inc. court stated: “[r]ecognizing that
consumers may lack incentives to prosecute small claims, many states created broad
provisions, allowing ‘any person’—not only consumers—to sue violators of [their
consumer protection acts].”159 These statutes commonly include “businesses . . . and

154. Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, 2018-NMCA-064, ¶ 10, 429 P.3d 338, 342
(2018) (“Its fundamental purpose is to protect consumers from unscrupulous business practices regardless
of whether those consumers were directly or indirectly affected.”).
155. Gandydancer, LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, 2019-NMSC-021, ¶ 23, 453 P.3d 434, 441
(2019).
156. Pridgen, supra note 7, at 911–12.
157. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 198, 239 (E.D.N.Y.
2001), rev’d in part, question certified sub nom., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip
Morris USA Inc., 344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2003), certified question accepted, 100 N.Y.2d 636, 801 N.E.2d
417 (2003), and certified question answered sub nom. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip
Morris USA Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 200, 818 N.E.2d 1140 (2004), and rev’d sub nom. Empire Healthchoice, Inc.
v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 393 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2004).
158. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
159. Id.
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other legal entities injured as a result of a violation” within the definition of “any
person.”160 States like New York and California, known to be among the states with
the most “aggressive statutes regarding enforcement of consumer protection laws,”
are also among the states that created private remedies for violations of consumer
protection laws.161 This section brings some examples of states that had adopted
some form of private remedy.162
i.

Michigan

Michigan’s consumer protection statute provides that “‘a person may bring
an action to . . . [e]njoin . . . a person who is engaging or about to engage in’ an
unlawful method, act, or practice, and may recover actual or statutory damages and
reasonable attorneys’ fees.”163 Under Michigan’s statute, a person is defined as an
“individual, corporation . . . or other legal entity.”164 Interpreting this statute, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that a business competitor
injured due to unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive trade practices had standing to
bring an action under the consumer protection act.165
In John Labatt Ltd. v. Molson Breweries, plaintiff Labatt and defendants
Molson Breweries and Miller Breweries were all in the business of importing,
marketing, and selling beer.166 Defendants were marketing some of their beers under
similar or identical terms used and registered as marks by the plaintiff.167 Plaintiff
filed a complaint claiming that, among other things, the defendants had violated the
Michigan consumer protection law, and as a result, plaintiff suffered damages.168
Defendants argued that the plaintiff—as a business competitor—did not have
standing to bring an action under the consumer protection statute.169 The court held
that an injured business competitor had a right of action under the statute and stated
that “finding a right of action in non-consumers under the [consumer protection act]
is the understanding that the intent of protecting consumers is well served by
allowing suit to be brought by non-consumers who have a significant stake in the
events.”170
ii.

Connecticut

The Connecticut consumer protection statute created a similar private
remedy. It provides that “[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money
160. Id. at 240.
161. Id. at 232.
162. The states selected here were chosen because their consumer protection statutes provide for some
kind of standing for business competitors. This selection serves merely as an illustration and should not
be interpreted as an exhaustive list of the states that confer such type of standing.
163. John Labatt Ltd. v. Molson Breweries, 853 F. Supp. 965, 967 (E.D. Mich. 1994); see also MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.903, 445.911(1) (West 2018).
164. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.902(d) (West 2018).
165. John Labatt Ltd., 853 F. Supp. at 970.
166. Id. at 966.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 967.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 970.
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or property . . . as a result of [an unlawful conduct under the statute] may bring an
action . . . to recover damages.”171 The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that a
violation of the state’s consumer protection law does not need to arise only from a
consumer relationship; a non-consumer may bring a claim under Connecticut’s
consumer protection statute.172
iii. Illinois
Illinois’s consumer protection statute created a cause of action for actual
damages and allowed “any person who suffers actual damages as a result of a
violation of [the] act committed by any other person [to] bring an action against such
person.”173 In Sullivan’s Wholesale Drugs Co., Inc. v. Faryl’s Pharmacy, the
defendants argued that a competitor-plaintiff did not have standing under Illinois’s
consumer protection act because it was not a consumer.174 The Appellate Court of
Illinois, Fifth District, disagreed, reasoning that, because the statute included “any
corporation, company or business entity” in the definition of person, and because of
the “clear and unambiguous language of the statute,” injured businesses had
“standing to bring a suit under the [a]ct.”175
iv.

New York

New York’s consumer protection act states that “any person who has been
injured by reason of any violation of [the act] may bring an action in his own name
to enjoin such unlawful act or practice, an action to recover his actual damages . . .
or both such actions.”176 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip
Morris, Inc.177 provides a good illustration of how the courts interpret the private
remedy created by the statute. A plaintiff must show “that the challenged act or
practice was consumer-oriented; second, that it was misleading in a material way;
and third, that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the deceptive act.”178
Additionally, the matter must “[affect] consumer interests,” regardless of whether a
consumer or business competitor brings the claim.179
In Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., the
plaintiffs (health insurers) brought a claim under the New York consumer protection
statute, alleging that the defendants fraudulently “distort[ed] the body of public

171. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110g(a) (West 2004).
172. Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 498–99, 656 A.2d 1009, 1020 (1995).
173. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2 (West 1973)
174. 214 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1082, 573 N.E.2d 1370, 1376 (1991).
175. Id. at 1082–83, 573 N.E.2d at 1376.
176. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2014)
177. 178 F. Supp. 2d 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), rev’d in part, question certified sub nom. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 344 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2003), certified question
accepted, 100 N.Y.2d 636, 801 N.E.2d 417 (2003), and certified question answered sub nom. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 200, 818 N.E.2d 1140 (2004), and rev’d
sub nom. Empire Healthchoice, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 393 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2004).
178. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (quoting Stutman v. Chem. Bank, 95 N.Y.2d
24, 29, 709 N.Y.S.2d 892, 731 N.E.2d 608 (2000)).
179. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (citing Securitron Magnalock Corp. v.
Schnabolk, 65 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir.1995)).
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knowledge” regarding smoking.180 Plaintiffs claim that defendants’ fraud induced
plaintiffs’ clients to smoke, and, as a result, plaintiffs were injured when they
absorbed the extra medical costs on behalf of their clients.181 The U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York held that “a health provider . . . damaged by a
fraud visited upon its insured may enforce the [consumer protection] statute in the
same way as other injured business.”182 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit explained that New York’s consumer protection act “allow[s] a
corporation to use [the statute] to halt a competitor’s deceptive consumer practice”
when the matter affects the public interest in the state.183 Thus, plaintiffs “ha[d]
standing to sue on [their] own behalf under [the statute].”184 However, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit could not “predict whether the New York Court of
Appeals would find [plaintiffs’] direct claim sufficiently direct to be actionable under
the consumer protection statute.185 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals of New York
held that plaintiffs had no standing to bring the action under the consumer protection
law not because they were not consumers, but because they were not the party
actually injured; plaintiffs’ claims were too remote.186
v.

California

A private right of action is recognized under two California consumer
protection statutes, each one with its own particularities. Under California’s Unfair
Competition Law, “any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or
property as a result of unfair competition” may sue for injunctive relief and
restitution of money or property acquired through unfair competition.187 Suits for
money damages are allowed under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, but they are
restricted to consumer-plaintiffs.188 Even though California limits claims for money
damages to consumers, business competitors still have a private right of action to sue
a competitor that has engaged in unfair competition: a claim for injunctive relief and
restitution.189 The purpose behind allowing injunctive relief is that it remedies a
public wrong.190
180. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 206, 210.
181. Id. at 206.
182. Id. at 230.
183. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 344 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir.),
certified question accepted, 100 N.Y.2d 636, 801 N.E.2d 417 (2003), and certified question answered sub
nom. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 200, 818 N.E.2d 1140
(2004).
184. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 344 F.3d at 219.
185. Id. at 222.
186. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 200, 208, 818 N.E.2d
1140, 1145 (2004).
187. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17203, 17204 (West 2008)
188. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(a) (West 2009) (“Any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of
the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful [unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices] may bring an action against that person to
recover.”).
189. Flannery v. VW Credit, Inc., 232 Cal. App. 4th 606, 617, 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 597 (2014).
190. Rogers v. Lyft, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 904, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2020), appeal dismissed in part, No.
20-15689, 2020 WL 9257963 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2020).
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Lessons that Can be Drawn from Other States’ Approaches

Recognizing competitor standing under consumer protection laws does not
mean a free pass to each and every type of claim against a business competitor.
Legislatures and courts can and should create limits to ensure that consumer welfare
will be protected. New York’s approach is a good example, where any person who
suffered injuries due to violations of the consumer protection act can recover—
including a business competitor. But recovery cannot occur when the damages are
too remote, as was the case in the Blue Cross & Blue Shield case,191 or when the
competitor’s actions do not impact consumers in general.192 Another alternative—
maybe with a less deterrent effect than New York’s approach—would be a system
similar to California’s, which allows “any person”—including a business
competitor—to sue for injunctive relief and restitution.
The examples described in this section show that a private right of action
for business competitors to sue for competitive injury under consumer protection
laws serves as another tool available to protect consumer welfare.
C.

A Suggestion

Recognizing that business competitors play a role in protecting the
marketplace and, consequently, in consumer protection is not a new idea. Antitrust
laws have long allowed suits by business competitors against competitors who
violated antitrust laws.193 As exemplified above, other states have also adopted the
approach that injured non-consumers—including business competitors—should be
allowed to sue businesses that engage in unfair or deceptive trade practices.194 The
New Mexico Legislature itself has already used competitor standing as a tool to
combat unfair or deceptive trade practices.195
Now that the New Mexico Supreme Court decision in Gandydancer has
eliminated competitive injury claims under the UPA—which is likely not what the
legislature intended—the New Mexico Legislature should revisit the UPA and
amend the statute to explicitly include a provision allowing business competitors to
sue competitors who engage in unfair or deceptive trade practices. Such an
amendment would be consistent with the history of the UPA, but more importantly,
would help deter future violations of the UPA; therefore, enhancing consumer
protection.
CONCLUSION
The argument that consumer protection would be undermined if
competitive injury claims were allowed under the UPA is simply not consistent with
191. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 200, 208, 818 N.E.2d
1140, 1145 (2004).
192. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 344 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir.),
certified question accepted, 100 N.Y.2d 636, 801 N.E.2d 417 (2003), and certified question answered sub
nom. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 3 N.Y.3d 200, 818 N.E.2d 1140
(2004).
193. See discussion supra Part II.B.
194. See discussion supra Part III.B.
195. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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the experience encountered in antitrust law where competitive injury claims serve as
a tool to advance not only the protection of the market but also to protect the market
for the benefit of consumers. A private remedy allowing business competitors to sue
competitors under the UPA would be an effective way to protect consumers as a
whole when individual consumers might lack the motivation and resources to sue
someone who is engaging in unfair or deceptive practices. Aware of the possibility
of being sued by a competitor, a business would be less likely to engage in unlawful
conduct under the UPA, and this legislation would achieve its deterrent effect.
A provision explicitly conferring standing for business competitors to bring
suit for violations of the UPA would be consistent with the broad current language
of the UPA, which allows any person to bring a suit for damages. Such a provision
would also be consistent with the MCA provision, which allows suits for competitive
injury due to competitors’ unfair or deceptive trade practices. After Gandydancer,
this is the most logical—and best—approach to avoid limiting the available tools for
consumer protection.

